[geeks] [rescue] consciousness immortality [was: Sun Sparcstation 20 hard disks]

[Sandwich Maker]

" From: Mouse <mouse at Rodents-Montreal.ORG>
" 
" >>> for me, it hinges on whether a real transference is ever possible,
" >>> not just copy/deletion.
" >> My point is that, depending on how you define "the same person", and
" >> depending on how the technology turns out to work, there may not be
" >> any difference between copy/delete and transfer.
" > there's a big one for the deleted copy...
" 
" Even _speaking of_ "the deleted copy" doesn't make sense unless there
" is a difference.

enumeration, for a start.

think of the original - the deleted copy, in 'moving' to silicon - as
the one you put -into- the 'xerox machine'.

" > yes, one can play word games with definitions, and much of a
" > definition depends on viewpoint.  you're arguing for the definition
" > of a person as the sum total of information etc. from a particular --
" > mind?  so a copy indistinguishable from the original -is- the
" > original in any meaningbful way - the same information 'image'.  just
" > like email.
" 
" I'm not sure I'd say I'm arguing for it.  I'm arguing that for all we
" know it might very well turn out to work that way, and we shouldn't
" assume otherwise unless/until we have evidence.
" 
" But, that aside, yes: I'm arguing that you may have a "one person goes
" in, two come out" process in which the two that come out are basically
" indistinguishable, so that neither has a stronger claim to being the
" original than the other.
" 
" Of course, they will be at least slightly different; if nothing else,
" they exist in different locations.  But that may be the only
" difference, even subjectively, between them - at least initially.

one ought to still be organic while the other is solid-state...  i
lean toward the belief that consciousness - and all of our
subconscious/periconscious talents - is an epiphenomenon of neural
activity in a complex neural system ['the brain'], and while you could
model that activity - even a particular example of that activity - in
other media, you'd only have a sim of the original.  [in fact, you're
-trying- to sim the original.]  a good sim could have identical
function.  it still isn't the original, even if it's good enough to
take the original's place.

" > but suppose you make 300 copies.  still a single person?
" 
" No, no more than the two were a single person.  (Unless that turns out
" to be how it happens to work, of course, but I don't think we're
" talking about single-shared-mind scenarios here.)

since twins don't exhibit any sign of single-shared-mind, i think we
can rule that out...

" 300 effectively identical persons with no way to choose one as "the
" original" is basically no different from two, not for the philosophical
" purposes at hand.
" 
" []
" 
" > on my side, while other copies could be people in their own rights,
" > only the original copy is -me-.
" 
" You are still clinging to this notion that there _is_ a single "me" in
" some sense which is true of one of the resulting persons but not the
" other(s).  I'm not convinced that will be true.  (I'm also not
" convinced it will be false, but that possibility doesn't seem to be in
" question.)

i'm willing to believe each copy would have a 'me' - himself.  i can
believe that, starting with identical functional structure and
information, they themselves could be confused as to which was the
original and which the copy, unless there's a way to tell if you have
a flesh-and-blood body or not.
________________________________________________________________________
Andrew Hay                                  the genius nature
internet rambler                            is to see what all have seen
adh at an.bradford.ma.us                       and think what none thought