[geeks] I just saw...

[Joost van de Griek]

Lionel Peterson wrote:

> All this talk of paper trail and audit receipts is a bad idea, in my
> opinion - if a machine makes two independent records,one electronic,
> one on paper - if they diverge, which is trusted? If one is not
> trusted, why include it in the process?

Both are trusted, but one is leading: the paper one. The electronic one
just provides a convenient and fast way of counting the votes, but it
is always recognised that it can be easily tampered with. If any
suspicion arises that the electronic tally is corrupted, the ballot box
is opened and the paper votes are counted.

True, paper votes can be tampered with, too, but the paper ballot
system has been in place for quite some time and is easily controllable.
The risk of fraud with paper votes is at an acceptable level; that of
the current electronic voting systems is not.

The process is laughably simple: the voting machine records the vote,
prints a receipt indicating what was voted, the voter checks the receipt
and deposits it into an old-fashioned ballot box.

Occam's Razor dictates that this is a miles better solution than the
myriad of security measures proposed by voting authoroties and voting
machine manufacturers which, quite frankly, does nothing but raise
suspicion that they are in fact unwilling to provide a proper solution
to the problems posed by electronic voting.

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