[geeks] [rescue] consciousness immortality [was: Sun Sparcstation 20 hard disks]

[Sandwich Maker]

" From: Mouse <mouse at Rodents-Montreal.ORG>
" 
" >> I'm not sure what "-me- the original" actually is,
" > for purposes of arg, in advance of any of this tech existing '-me-
" > the original' is the one who's involved in this discussion.
" 
" That "me" will no longer exist in a month, never mind by the time we
" learn how to build the sort of tech we're talking about here.

-this- 'me' will - barring mortal calamity - still exist in a month.

" It may seem that I'm hairsplitting.  I don't think I am.  I'm
" (deliberately) calling into question what it is that we mean when we
" use pronouns or other conceptualizations that _ever_ consider a person
" who exists at one time and a person who exists at another time to be
" the same person.  "Me" is just one of the sharpest forms of this.
" 
" Yes, I think I have some idea what you're talking about; I too use such
" language (one could hardly use English otherwise) and have _some_ sort
" of conceptual framework to back it.  But that conceptual framework is a
" relatively vague one; in particular, it is not clear to me exactly what
" it is about tomorrow-me and today-me that causes me to consider them
" the same person.  I can think of some plausible possibilities, but they
" lead to different results when applied to the scenario under discussion
" here, which is why I'm bringing them up.  (This also is part of why I
" find the prosect fascinating; I _like_ mind-stretching experiences, and
" ones that would help me nail down some slippery concepts I particularly
" welcome.)
" 
" >> [...] the distinction you're trying to draw [...]
" > for me, it hinges on whether a real transference is ever possible,
" > not just copy/deletion.
" 
" My point is that, depending on how you define "the same person", and
" depending on how the technology turns out to work, there may not be any
" difference between copy/delete and transfer.

there's a big one for the deleted copy...

yes, one can play word games with definitions, and much of a
definition depends on viewpoint.  you're arguing for the definition of
a person as the sum total of information etc. from a particular --
mind?  so a copy indistinguishable from the original -is- the original
in any meaningbful way - the same information 'image'.  just like
email.

but suppose you make 300 copies.  still a single person?  what if each
demands the right to vote?  on my side, while other copies could be
people in their own rights, only the original copy is -me-.  mere
copying is not immortality, even if it looks that way to others.

" >>> unity is a promising concept, but -- here's a nightmare for ya:
" >>> [protoplasmic portion of a fused mind dies]
" >> That's no more of a nightmare to me than the prospect of a
" >> purely-meat me suffering death of a part - a stroke, for example -
" >> and thereby suffering a very similar loss.
" > and no less of a nightmare, either.
" 
" True enough.  I don't find it very nightmarish, though.

not a nightmare if a stroke deprived you of the ability to speak?  or
see and hear?  left you paraplegic?  you're a resilient person.

" "Does it
" trouble you to contemplate the years before your birth?  Then why does
" it those after your death?"

time's arrow.  they are not symmetrical.

actually, i'm not worried at all about the years after my death; it's
my death itself that worries me.  i want more years -before- my death.

" I gain skills routinely, and lose them
" almost as routinely; this seems only marginally worse.

" Compare with the prospect of the silicon fraction "dying" and the "me"
" losing its capabilities, falling back to the original, protoplasmic,
" model.  Do you find that as nightmarish?  Why or why not?

i don't, because i started with the organic part.  i might miss my
tennis racket if it 'died'...  granted, a silicon mind enhancer might
be complicated enough that no two are exactly alike and thus
individual units could be said to have 'personality'.  it'd have to
give me some ability that losing would be like becoming paraplegic for
me to find its 'death' nightmarish.  i'm not sure i can imagine that,
but if society became organized around one, losing it could
effectively be crippling.
________________________________________________________________________
Andrew Hay                                  the genius nature
internet rambler                            is to see what all have seen
adh at an.bradford.ma.us                       and think what none thought