[geeks] I just saw...

[jvdg at sparcpark.net]

Lionel Peterson wrote:

>>> All this talk of paper trail and audit receipts is a bad idea, in my
>>> opinion - if a machine makes two independent records,one electronic,
>>> one on paper - if they diverge, which is trusted? If one is not
>>> trusted, why include it in the process?
>>
>> Both are trusted, but one is leading: the paper one. The electronic one
>> just provides a convenient and fast way of counting the votes, but it
>> is always recognised that it can be easily tampered with. If any
>> suspicion arises that the electronic tally is corrupted, the ballot box
>> is opened and the paper votes are counted.
>
> Let me be clear. I favor paper ballots over "automated" solutions.

So do I. But since we do have the technology to speed up the process of
counting the votes (and lowering the margin of error), why not use it?

> What dual-record proponents seem to be saying is:
>
> We will collect electonic and paper-based duplicate ballots for each vote.
>
> But we acknowledge that the electronic results are more easily tampered
> with (i.e. one software change is easier than altering 40,000 paper
> ballots).
>
> We will give preference to the electronic results UNLESS we suspect a
> problem, THEN we will count the paper counts.

Correct.

> My argument is that if electronic results are so much more fragile than
> paper (as confirmed by the need for the paper audit trail backup), why
> not just go with paper?

See above. Are you so disenfranchised that you will not give the voting
process the benefit of doubt, for now? Can we not assume that voting fraud
is the exception, rather than the rule, and that therefore in the vast
majority of cases, the electronic vote (count) can be used without fear of
fraud, thus making the voting process quicker, less labour intensive and
less prone to counting errors?

> If you craft a subtle hack that alters votes in a non-obvious way, the
> paper trail will not be consulted,and the fraud never found...

This will always be true, paper or electronic ballot be damned. Like I
said: in the end, you're going to have to trust someone, somewhere along
the line. I'd say that the controllability of paper votes exceeds that
of electronic ones greatly. At least in my country, it is entirely
possible for any citizen to reside in the polling station all day and
check for himself if anyone is tampering with the ballot box. In the
case of electronic voting equipment, you can sit there all you want,
but you won't see what's going on inside the machine. This is essential
to the voting system; it is controllable by anyone. This is the reason
I say we should either vote the traditional way, or electronically with
a paper trail. Any other way takes this possibility of control and
replaces it with yet another level of trust in the authority that
checks the voting machines. That, to me, is unacceptable.

,xtG
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